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Abstract
Recurrent disasters with multiple casualties and important property loss occurred in the last decade in all types of
traffic tunnels in Europe and Asia in particular, where existing and planned new tunnels are the largest in number
and important for the economy. The aftermath is a new focus on fire safety issues in tunnels on behalf of
different authorities, as shown here by a brief review of the European Research and Technological Framework
program currently supported by the European Commission. The paper outlines that fire safety level in a tunnel
clearly depends on a variety of human factors, other than the simple behavioral aspects of tunnel users
confronted to the event of a fire. This is illustrated by facts reported from a number of past accidents in traffic
tunnels, including the recent tragedy that took place in the Daegu metro in February last year.
1. Introduction
One apparent factor explaining the number of fire disasters that occurred recently in
European tunnels is the sharp increase in traffic (in particular freight traffic in road tunnels),
in the relatively old tunnel European network. However, significant accidents have also
occurred in more recent links (e.g. the Channel tunnel accident in 1996, despite of the
numerous safety studies that are known to have significantly raised the overall costs of
construction). Besides, in Europe and elsewhere, new challenges in matter of fire safety issues
are going to be faced due to the impressive new projects under completion (e.g. the "big dig"
project in Boston [1], or the superimposed roadways tunnel structure for passenger cars traffic
on the A86 highway nearby Paris). Moreover, there is also a sharp demand for new
underground structures to facilitate transit in urban areas or for crossing geographical barriers
on a worldwide basis.
Haack recently presented a picture of the tunneling activity [2] that in particular outlines
the following figures :
• Operational tunnels in Europe represent more than 15,000 km in overall length
• Marketing studies have led to estimating the overall potential lengths of new tunnel
projects to some 2,000 km in Europe, 650 km in South America and 2,350 km in
global Asia.
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Is 'human behavior in fire' a real topic of interest within this background or should the
fire safety engineers and authorities and other stakeholders in tunneling still rely mainly on
the so-called "hard fire sciences". This is the matter on which the authors are willing to
discuss here.
2. The current context
2.1 A recent focus on tunnel safety issues in relation with past accidents
An unexpected series of actual disasters in road and rail tunnels occurred in European
countries and Asia in the last decade. These tunnel accidents have been extensively
commented, on real time through the media at first and with more progressive and sound
feedback in specialized technical literature. Table 1 is a summary of the major tunnel fire
events that were deplored from 1995 to time of publishing. At first, when the data are
analyzed over the global time scale of traffic tunneling activity, it comes out that dramatic fire
accidents in tunnels are increasing in frequency.
date
Oct. 95
March 96
March 99
May 99
Nov. 00
Oct. 01
Feb. 03
location
Baku (Azerbaijan)
Isola del Femine (Italy)
Mont-Blanc (France-It.)
Tauern tunnel (Austria)
Kaprun (Austria)
St-Gotthard (Switzerland)
Daegu (Korea)
tunnel type
Metro
road
road
road
rail (cable)
road
metro
length (m)
na
150
11600
6400
3400
16920
na
# deaths
289
5
39
12
155
11
196
Table 1 : the last series of tragedies from tunnel fires
Beyond the overall death toll paid in the mentioned list of accidents, probably the worse series
in a single decade period of time to date, the data in table 1, together with more
comprehensive work dealing with tunnel accident database management and warehousing
[3,4,5] clearly outline basic technical features such as :
• any type of traffic tunnel is concerned (including cable rail tunnels used in ski stations),
• any type of vehicles may be involved (The Mont-blanc disaster of March 1999 alone hit
23 heavy truck vehicles, several cars, vans, emergency vehicles and even one motorbike)
[6],
• other scenarios than rolling stock or road vehicles may be involved in a given fire scenario
in a tunnel ;
• explosion, although a rare event, is to be taken into consideration (in case of transportation
of dangerous goods such as LPG, see lessons from the Palermo (Isolla del Femine) tunnel
accident analysis [7] ; apart from the explosion hazard arising from flammable gases and
liquids transported through tunnels, terrorism, as recently shown in the metro of Moscow
early this year (more than 30 people were reported killed), is another potential cause of an
explosion that may be followed by a fire scenario in traffic tunnels ;
• the provision of adequate technical safety measures (emergency ventilation systems,
places of safety, alarm systems...) is of essential importance ;
• mass transit systems (e.g. metro tunnels) are a source of concern in the event of a big fire,
due to the fact that hundreds of people are liable to be trapped in a single accident, and
that particular difficulties pertain to egress, fire-fighting and rescue in such underground
structures (see section 4),
If m a number of cases, technical factors (e.g. inadequate reaction-to-fire performance of
materials that are used in rail carriages, problems with brakes on trucks...) largely explain the
occurrence of fire events in tunnels, it must also be stated that all those worse case fire
scenarios have been influenced in their course of events and consequences by many human
factors affecting all stakeholders. Hopefully, the societal perception of risk due to fire in a
tunnel has by now drastically been pushed ahead, and this is acting as a booster. Indeed,
safety issues must now be treated in any new tunnel project as a priority, including the
account of all human factors such as the appraisal of communication means in place to warn
users and emergency services, suitability of emergency exits or places of safety (in terms of
number, configuration and ease to locate in smoky environment by users), traffic density
factors, coordination anticipation of all actors of an emergency response and so forth.
2.2. Human behavior in fires : a growing engineering science
It must be stated that no overview of fire behavior in the context of tunnel safety has been
published so far, to our knowledge.
However, learning on a formal basis about human behavior in fires started decades ago,
essentially in the framework of conventional buildings, as recalled recently by Shields et al,
in their very useful and informative review and prospective work [8] presented at the IAFSS
Conference in Poitiers. Shields and Proulx depicted the 'human behavior science' as
relatively well advanced in a number of topics related to fire safety issues. Human behavior in
fires has now entered the area of scholarly studies in some Universities (University of Ulster,
University of Greenwich in England...). The mentioned reference is a good source for a
global perception of achievements about human behavior in fires versus time from the mid
50's to end of last century.
Other references, like the SFPE handbook of Fire Protection Engineering [9] , or the
collective work edited in the form of a SFPE guidance document compiling engineering
science about 'human behavior in fires' released last year [10], make additional powerful
resources for those needing an overview of existing global knowledge.
Besides, since 1998, regular conferences have been established in Europe and overseas,
focussing on the matter such as those organized by the University of Ulster (Fire-Sert) and
University of Greenwich [11,12]
In practice, many aspects governing important safety features in relation with fires in built
environment have achieved a fairly good level of understanding. This includes [10] :
• knowledge about : cueing, competitive behavior, impact of crowd density on movement
speeds, danger perception, disorientation caused by smoke, importance and modes of
awareness of building environment, importance of pre-movement time, reduced mobility,
aging effects, stress factors... ;
• key roles of communication schemes and incentive messages to help evacuation.
Studies about human behavior in the transportation area have concentrated so far on
evacuation problems in boats and aircrafts [13].
3. The current European Research framework on tunnel safety
The European Union, through its 5th RTD (research and technologic development)
framework program is actively supporting a number of initiatives that involve, in a joint and
coordinated effort, nearly all European experts having proven capabilities in tunnel
engineering and associated safety aspects. The 6th FP is expected to support remaining effort
to reach what is expected to be the acceptable level of knowledge needed for sustainable
development of tunneling activity and related operational issues. Khoury in a recent paper
[14] provided a detailed description of what is going on. No less than 7 European consortiums
are working in well defined and ambitious research programs or networking activities in
relation with safety issues, all of the European authors of this paper are stakeholders in one of
several of these. Some data on the mentioned programs are reported in table 2 with their
dedicated web sites addresses that allow, once visitors have registered, to know more, track
progress of work, and even contribute in some cases as associated partners.
Name of Project
DARTS
FIT
UPTUN
VIRTUALFIRES
SIRTAKI
SAFE TUNNEL
SafeT
Durable and Reliable
Tunnel Structures
Fire in Tunnels (European
Thematic Network)
Upgrading fire safety in
existing TUNnels
Virtual Real Time Fire
Emergency Simulator
Safety Improvement in
Road & Rail Tunnels using
advanced ICTand
Knowledge Intensive DSS
Innovative systems and
frameworks for enhancing
of traffic safety in road
tunnels
Safety in Tunnels
(European thematic
network)
Time table
2001-2004
2001-2005
2002-2006
2001-2004
2001-2004
2001-2004
2003-2006
Web site address
www.dartSDroiect.net
www.etnfit.net
www.uotun.net
www.virtualfires.ora
www.sirtakiproject.com
www.crfDroiect-eu.ora
www.safetunnel.net
table 2 : major EU sponsored R&D and networking work in progress
All of those projects are indeed considering human factors as a key element in their
respective technical programs and deliverables. Other useful European initiatives have
recently provided useful deliverables for taking account of human responses in fires and other
type of disasters and to develop training interactive tools. These are the NEDIES project
(http://nedies.irc.it/default.asp) and the A TEAM project (www.esso.co.at/A-TEAM).
3.2. The FIT activity and human behavior issues
As an example of this, the FIT (Fires In Tunnels) thematic network involves no less than
33 partners from 12 European countries, coordinated by BBRI (Belgium). It aims at
establishing and promoting networking activities to optimize concerted efforts on fire safety
in tunnels. The current activity essentially consists in warehousing appropriate data, sorting
and organizing them into web accessible deliverables such as series of user-friendly databases
about Fires in Tunnels and related matters [15]. Databases involve records on past accidents,
computer models, testing facilities available, etc. In addition, the consortium works at the
establishment of technical reports (design fires, other appropriate guidance documents). One
of those guidance documents in progress is covering the emergency response management
and is available for public comments. Figure 1 just illustrates part of work package 1 which
consists in the establishment of a database compiling records of useful traffic tunnel accidents
and incidents. Today, the short summary list of these records includes nearly 150 entries
covering accidents since the beginning of the XXth century, involving tunnel fire incidents or
major accidents in some 20 different countries and containing some 35 records with fatalities.
The consortium encourages registered users to comment on existing entries and chiefly add
missing reports. One breakthrough of this database is actually the number of entries giving
sense to some statistical treatment, including on human behavior. As far as the human
behavior is concerned, the database manager promoted the introduction of small incidents as
well as major accidents, as the former happen sometimes to be unique sources of valuable
information on human aspects, and in particular on unexpected -good or bad ! - human
responses to fire incidents in traffic tunnels. From this database, other statements regarding
fire safety issues in tunnels in relation with human have been identified. One of those is the
fact that human factors are potential sources of failures on the whole life cycle of a tunnel,
including construction phase, maintenance and refurbishment works and even 'pre-
commissioning period' and associated inauguration days.
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Figure I : example ofdelivery of FIT thematic network (WP1) so to : www.etnfit.net
This latter view will be developed in due time in the form of a coming presentation to the
next Interflam1 Fire Science and Engineenng conference to be held in Edinburgh [16].
3.3. The UPTUN program
UPgrading TUNnels is another impressive European collective effort to cope with the
existing network of tunnels, which was earlier presented as very developed and bearing heavy
traffic throughout the EU. UPTUN stands for "Cost Effective, sustainable and innovative
UPgrading methods for fire safety in existing TUNnels". It is a four year research and
development project with 41 partners originating from 13 different European countries The
whole project indeed is concerned with human response that the Community may bring to
further extent safety and reliability in existing underground rail and road structures. UPTUN
promotes a holistic approach, focusing on research about human factors, and in particular on
the interaction of : a) the operator, b) rescue services and emergency teams, c) tunnel users,
since it was clearly proven in past accidents that survivability of people trapped in a tunnel,
largely depends on adequate coordination in the behaviors and actions of the three categories
of people quoted.
WP3 is entirely devoted to the study of the human response and will comprise behavioral
analysis of drivers by use of a simulator and tests involving users in a real tunnel facility in
which a fire situation is simulated [17,18].
3.4 Investigations about incidents and accidents in tunnels
Major tragedies have been analyzed extensively although sometimes confronted to
limitation due to the context of litigation enquiries.
At present time, some aspects coming from records of accidents in tunnels dealing with
the human response are well known : e.g. :
• 'traffic lights set to red' is not enough to impede drivers to enter a tunnel portal, in the
event of a fire
• passenger interchanges are particularly critical areas in case of a fire emergency [20].
Further careful analysis, as made possible by above mentioned European work may teach
more. For instance, keeping inside vehicles seems to be considered in many circumstances as
being a safer option than moving out and evacuation to a place of safety or using an
emergency exit. Smoky environment is not necessarily perceived immediately as a potential
life threat.
The Channel tunnel fire (trans-Manche link between France and UK) (Nov. 1996) [26]
This fire was a real warning (in additional to tremendous source of concerns for the
operator in terms of repairs and economical consequences), as it outlined potential problems
due to inadequate communications systems and to much complicated procedures in case of an
emergency. It also outlined that the worse case scenario involving several HGVs in a single
fire scenario was an actual matter of concern and should have been taken into account to
define appropriate mitigation measures.
The Baltimore Howard street tunnel fire. USA (July 2001) [ 191
This one involved the problem of transportation of dangerous goods through tunnels in
urban areas, had significant impact in terms of surface traffic congestion, caused important
concern to the fire brigades for access and fire-fighting operations
The Homer tunnel fire (Nov. 2002) in New-Zealand (Nov. 2002)
The fire affected a bus carrying some 50 passengers in a very rustic tunnel without any
lighting or safety provisions. The bus driver had the brilliant idea to assist all passengers in
their escape through absolute darkness due to smoke by ordering them to chain each other by
their hands on their move out of the tunnel : a clear success for which we was officially
awarded later on [4].
4. Further discussions about human behavior in fires following early
analysis of the Daegu metro fire and some other tunnel fire incidents
4.1 The Daegu fire tragedy and first lessons to be learnt
The accident took place on the 18th of February 2003, close to 10 a.m., at the level of the
Jungangno station of line 1 linking Daegu Si to Jung Gu Namil Dong (see figure 2),
comprising 30 stations in total.
Figure 2: location of the fire in the city of Daegu, 3r town agglomeration of Korea
The concerned station spreads on some 10 000 m2 of floor area, distributed on three
different underground levels : a) third basement contains the platform with access to trains,
second basement is the central area with passenger interchange (to opposite platform) and the
toll gate, first basement shelters retail stores and staircases. The built environment consists of
reinforced concrete structure. Trains circulating in the Daegu metro have an average of about
770 passengers [21].
It is reported that major important facts in the course of events are as follows : a 56 year
old arsonist set fire in a first train that had stopped seconds earlier at the platfom by igniting a
bottle filled with kerosene. Fire spread to arsonist's cloths and a train seat nearby inside one
of the car. Then fire is reported to have spread rapidly into the first train (train 1079).
Temperature and heat flux patterns were high enough to set alight a second 6 car train (train
1080) that unfortunately stopped some time after on the opposite platform.
Likely to be known by a majority of the attendees, the toll paid in this fire scenario as a
result of these course of events is enormous : 196 people were killed, a majority of the
fatalities being found in the second train. In addition 147 were injured, including 10
firefighters. Accordingly, property loss is also very high (figure 3). At the present time, the
authors wish to keep prudent in the analysis of this drama. An obvious lesson is that nearly all
went wrong, due to a series of technical defects and global inadequate human response of all
parties involved.
Human response issues under investigation in technical and litigation enquiries being
performed, include :
- Erroneous choices in the design phase of rolling stock (reaction to fire performance of
selected components) as considered to state of the art,
- Arson act (to be related to mental disability of the guy ?) at the origin of the fire,
- problems relevant to the initial response given by the second train driver (stopped at the
platform, took of the key, left the train doors locked that resulted in the fact that nobody
escaped from train 1080),
- problems relevant to emergency response management (who has to do what ? and so
on. . . ) '
- saturation of'first aid' services available at hospitals nearby
- delayed information to victims relatives and related concerns with the after crisis
communication and management.
But the more striking issue is indeed the unexpected behavior of most passengers, waiting
strangely in smoke environment as if they were expecting instructions in case of an
emergency.
Figure 3 : train car bum out
Figure 2 illustrates the burn out process that affected most of carriages of the trains
affected by the fire.
Survivors :
JUST WAITED
CALLED UP SOMEBODY
MOVED TO OTHER TRAIN CAR
LEFT TRAIN
48%
20%
16%
7%
Figure 4 : analysis of the behavioral réponse of the passengers in the Daegu metro fire
The view in Figure 4 is really hard to believe for a European citizen, however the picture
was actually captured by one survivor who escaped the carriage before untenable conditions
had been reached. Passengers' first reactions in this tragedy were confirmed from the
interview of 146 survivors (see table in the right end side of figure 4) [21]. Nearly one half of
the survivors were reporting their first cognitive action was just waiting inside train cars.
Some other 20% just called up somebody, people that at first moved to another car in the
same train account for some other 16%, and eventually, only 7% of the survivors did just the
proper first action that had to be done in such a situation : just leave the train ! This statement
just means that people just react according to cultural context and available information that
they were able to make use of, to decide what to do.
4.2 Lessons from other accidents
The next query is how far human behavior in tunnels may be positively influenced by
passed disasters in tunnels ? Partial response at least may be delivered from the European
scene, by comparing human reactions that were observed, on the one hand in the Mont-Blanc
tunnel fire (the first of a series of dramatic fires in tunnels), in 24th of March 1999, and in the
other end during the Tauern tunnel fire, that took place in Austria about two months later. It
was indeed reported that tunnel users, who were not directly hit by the initial course of event
that led to the fire, in the latter accident, rushed out of their vehicles and promptly rushed out
of the tunnel, though the portal was not too far from the fire scene. In Korea, a bus fire took
place in the Honggimum tunnel [25] in Seoul that could have had dramatic consequences if
other tunnel users that witnessed the situation had not made their mind to behave with
altruism by starting the fire-fighting operations by themselves, making use of the fire hydrants
normally at disposal for the local fire service. Still more recently, other situations involving
bus fires were remarkably well handled due to extraordinary behavior of the bus drivers, there
also in Europe (France, Slovenia), as well as in Oceania (New-Zealand) [4], highlighting the
importance of influencing 'common public' decision, when confronted to unusual unsafe
environment, such a fire in a tunnel.
Memory or sound based judgment seemed thus in those cases to have influenced
positively tunnel users' first response (although quite different in the tunnel fire incidents
quoted). It would be dangerous of course to rely only on self education of people either from
memory or due to professional background. 'Memory' driven behavioral response is just not
enough, it may work in some circumstances just by chance. As a matter of facts, a more
systemic approach of human factors must be promoted.
5. Final discussion
At the time, addressing the fire problem within tunnels is much more than considering
engineering aspects in relation with time needed for evacuation, as often done in conventional
buildings. More basic knowledge on human behavior in tunnel fires is to be learnt from past
accidents including happy end events, that must be given the appropriate attention by the
operators. The FIT network is there to help in collecting adequately the relevant information
and the readers are encourage to use the FIT web site to report on useful incidents that
occurred in the past or that might arise in the future. We also encourage them to use the forum
organized there for open discussion on the subject.
All stakeholders in tunneling operation (from constructor to tunnel users) must understand
the impact of human behavior on survivability in tunnel fires, not only the tunnel users as it
was too often the case in the past. Lessons from past incidents also show that differences may
anse in behavioral responses of people due to cultural background : this is also to be taken
into account appropriately through adequate communication, education and training.
Indeed, education is actually a key factor for a better appraisal of safety problems in
relation with the event of a fire in a tunnel. Education is considered essential for all
stakeholders including tunnel designers [27], tunnel operators and even regulators. When the
question comes to educating the users, should the education of the professional drivers, i.e.
rail, bus and coach drivers be a priority for tunnel users ? All of them should receive
education in correct emergency behavior, but there is a question of priority to be addressed.
Further research in the field of human responses and performance in tunnel fires is
obviously another main conclusive comment to be made.
To the opinion of the authors, adequate experiments, at full-scale in real tunnel
environments, such as the one reported by L.C. Boer & J. van Wijngaarden [18] as well as
survey interviews of survivors of tunnel fire accidents [22] is considered essential :
• to understand and incorporate behavioral issues of people in the design and operation
of all types of traffic tunnels [23,27] (mass transit systems should be a priority target),
including differences due to culture,
• to investigate improved options for communications systems within tunnel
environments in order to provide instructions to tunnel fire victims, so that they can
optimize the usage of evacuation routes to places of safety or emergency exits.
An international interview campaign of survivors of tunnel disasters and incident would be
beneficial to gain expertise from each other, and to spare time : such a work is being
undertaken by University of Greenwich who are studying human behavior issues associated
with the World Trade Center Tragedy.
Finally, establishing, testing and training on emergency plans for a variety of emergency
scenarios during normal operations of a tunnel is also of prime importance. Major failures in
the past were attributed at least partially to the fact this wasn't done properly. As a result, this
has been recently made mandatory, in European countries.
Regular auditing of fire safety management procedures is also to be encouraged.
Harmonization of technical safety measures in addition, as far as possible on a world wide
basis is another important target, not necessarily unfeasible...
To summarize, humans m a whole, create problems and can solve them.
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